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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL AMBIGUITY AND ABUSE
IN ARGENTINA - THE MILITARY REIGN 1976-1983"
L CONsTTUTIONAL SHAM
For five decades Argentina endured chaos and repression.' A
country which boasted of abundant resources, a literate,
homogeneous population and a high standard of living, became a
"wasted promise."' Ruled alternatively by military juntas and civilians
from 1930 to 1983, 3 the country drifted into an abyss of
authoritarianism. Leaders fell in and out of power, rarely able to
complete a full term in office.' But one constant riddled each of
the governments --"constitutional illegality."5  Vague aspirations
toward rule of law gave way to assaults on constitutionally
guaranteed rights.6 Instead of protecting the constitutional values of
the governed, those governing ignored, undermined, or withheld
them.7  Rule of law became a hollow expression.8  Government
* The author would like to thank Abby Fiorella for her invaluable guidance and insight.
1. See Schumacher, Defending Argentina's New Democracy, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1984, §
6 (Magazine), at 28.
2. Zalaquett, From Dictatorship to Democracy, NEw REPUBUc, Dec. 16, 1985, at 18.
3. See G. WYNA, ARGENTINA: ILLUSIONS & RRALmEs 45-48 (1986).
4. Elon, Letter From Argentina, THE NEw YORKER, July 21, 1986, at 74. "In the last fifty-
six years, Argentina has seen eight successful coup d'etat, innumerable aborted coup d'etat,
and eleven military dictatorships; since the Second World War, no freely elected
administration has lasted its full term except that of Juan Per6n . .. ." Id
5. D. PONEMAN, ARGENTINA: DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 128 (1987).
6. See Feinrider, Judicial Review and the Protection of Human Rights Under Military
Governments in Brazil and Argentina, 5 SUFFOLK TRANSNArL L.J. 171, 187 (1981).
7. See infra notes 18-56 and accompanying text. See also D. PONEMAN. supra note 5, at 39
wherein he states:
[T]he military trumped democracy with force. Civilian politicians either collaborated
in this constitutional affront or encouraged it by their incompetence. Discredit
touches all.
Simple, left-right, civil-military distinctions fail. Per6n first sought power through
the Radicals. The Radicals later sought power through Per6n .... Civilians sought
power through military coups.... Opportunism was the only constant.
Id.
8. See D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 195.
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without rules was the norm.9
A veil of legitimacy masked the deception. Ritualistically
claiming adherence to the constitution, the leader of the day
spouted catch phrases such as "guarding the Constitution," "saving
the country," "restoring order," and "national security" to justify
intrusions upon individual rights." Over time the pattern became
familiar."
Idealistically, Argentina was a democracy with a written
constitution enacted over 100 years ago. 2 In reality, the country was
ruled by a series of authoritarian governments characterized in
degrees by fraud, excess, ineptitude, and terror. 3 Each manipulated,
9. See Dworkin, Report From Hell, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, July 17, 1986, at 11, 12.
10. J. SIMPSON & J. BENNETT, THE DISAPPEARED AND THE MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA:
THE STORY OF THE 11,000 ARGENTINIANS WHO VANISHED 47 (1985). For example, the day
after the military seized power from Isabel Per6n, the junta broadcasted a message to the
Argentines declaring its intentions. "[Tihe armed forces must put an end to the situation
which has burdened the nation .... This government will be inbued with a profound national
spirit, and will respond only to the most sacred interests of the nation and its inhabitants."
Id See also G. WYNIA. supra note 3, at 87.
11. These proclamations began when General Josd F. Uriburu, who led the military coup
of 1930, declared his "respect for the Constitution and the basic laws in force." D. PONEMAN,
supra note 5, at 3.
In 1943, after another coup, General Arturo Rawson declared the military's duty "to
put the nation in order." J. SIMPSON & J. BENNEIr, supra note 10, at 43. When he was
elected in 1946, General Juan Per6n, Argentina's most notorious dictator, declared his intent
to fashion a "new Argentina" and to make the constitution "practical." G.I. BLANKSTEN,
PER6N'S ARGENTINA 161, 156 (1953). Yet, Per6n designed a new Argentine Constitution to
expand his control and suppress individual liberty. Id at 63, 161-73.
Per6n, himself, was overthrown by the military in 1955 and replaced by Arturo Frondizi.
A military coup forced Frondizi from power in 1962. Arturo Illia succeeded Frondizi, only
to be thrown out by the military three years later in 1966. Per6n returned with his wife
Isabel in 1973. After Per6n's death, Isabel replaced him as president. However, the military
overpowered Isabel in 1976. J. SIMPSON & J. BENNETT, supra note 10, at 47-48. As authors
Simpson and Bennett explain:
[T]ime after time, the military believed its own rhetoric and persuaded the people
of Argentina to believe it too; the saviors of the nation found it both pleasurable
and profitable to step in from time to time. And the longer they existed as a
political force, the more the privileges grew ....
Id at 48.
12. Constitucion Naci6n, (Argent. 1853). English translation reprinted in A. BLAUSTEIN &
G. FLANZ, 1 CONSTrrUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 3 (1987) [hereinafter
CONsr. ARGENT.]. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
13. See Cox, The Souring of the Argentine Dream, HARPERS, May 1985, at 53-54. Arguably,
Roberto M. Ortiz, who was appointed as presidential successor to General Agustfn P. Justo
in 1938, tried to stop fraudulent trends. But, due to illness, Ortiz was forced to resign after
two years in office. He was replaced by Ram6n S. Castillo, who perpetuated political
corruption. J.A. PAGE, PERON, A BIOGRAPHY 42-43 (1983).
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evaded, stretched, and twisted the constitution, rendering it finally,
impotent."
A constitution cannot function when the leaders, who have the
responsibility to implement and protect it, pervert it to serve their
own immediate political purposes. 5 Abrogation of this sort was
never more blatant or repugnant in Argentina than during the
period of military rule from 1976 to 1983.6 Chilean human rights
lawyer, Jos6 Zalaquett, revealed the anomaly:
[T]he greatest crime is one perpetuated by the authority
against the individual, a crime that counts on the ultimate
strength - the power of the state - to secure impunity. For
14. See D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 128.
15. General Juan Per6n's Argentina is a vivid example of the constitutional sham that is
perpetuated when a leader acts for personal power. When General Per6n became president
in 1946, he created a new constitution and assumed virtually all control in the country. See
generally G.I. BLANKsIEN, supra note 11. As author George Blanksten pointed out, at the
height of Per6n's dictatorship:
The separation of powers has been written into the text of the Constitution of 1949,
it is true; but in the "new Argentina" this division of authority is a legalistic fiction.
President Per6n's control of the Legislative and Judicial Powers is as complete as his
domination of the Executive Power. The voice of the Constitution of 1949, whether
it comes from executive, legislative, or judicial lips, is the voice of Juan Domingo
Per6n.
Id at 132. The 1853 Constitution "remained to mingle strangely with the new." R.
CRASSWELLER, PERON AND THE ENIGMAS OF ARGENTINA 195 (1987).
Additional examples of constitutional abrogation carried out by power mongers can be
found in: Pinochet's Chile, see generally J. TIMERMAN, CHILE: DEATH IN THE SOUTH, (1987);
Rafael Trujillo's Dominican Republic, see J.A. PAGE, supra note 13, at 361-62; Noriega's
Panama, see Pitt, Panama Declares 'State of Urgency' In Face of Unrest, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19,
1988, at § 1, col. 6.
Constitutional protections have, at times, been negated in Brazil, Peru, Uraguay, and
Bolivia when elected governments were overthrown by the military. See D. PONEMAN, supra
note 5, at xv.
16. See A. DABAT & L. LORENZANO, ARGENTINA: THE MALVINAS AND THE END OF
MILITARY RULE 145 (1984 ed.).
The military dictatorship installed by the coup of March 1976 was the most totalitarian
and authoritarian ever seen in Argentina, and perhaps anywhere in Latin America.
Unlike the Brazilian military or the Pinochet regime in Chile, the Argentinian Junta
could not directly base itself upon any organized civilian force, and therefore had to
rely on the army and police themselves in order to construct a new institutional
system. The supreme authority resided in the heads of the army, navy and air force,
who jointly appointed the president of the Republic and supervised his activity. The
rest of the state apparatus was structured around this purely military force, which held
in thrall the judiciary, the educational system, the mass media and the various social
organizations, and carried decisive weight in provincial and municipal government, and
in the main companies and offices depending on the federal government.
Id at 145-46.
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the people are never more helpless than when the force meant
to protect their rights is used to violate them. It is the
starkest defenselessness. The terror of the shepherd turned
wolf. State terrorism."
IL CONSrIUTIIONAL GUARAMN_
Argentina has one of the oldest and most enduring constitutions
in Latin America.18 Closely modeled after the United States
Constitution, it provides for a tripartite government of divided and
enumerated powers.19 Provisions similar to those in the United
States Constitution protect individual rights such as the rights to
work, trade, enter, travel through, and leave Argentina, publish ideas
uncensored, associate, teach, practice religion, and dispose of
property.2' Also guaranteed are the rights to equal protection21 and
due process.' Indeed, in the Preamble, the framers expressed their
objective of "constituting a national union, ensuring justice,
preserving domestic peace, providing for the common defense,
promoting the general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty
to ourselves, to our posterity, and to all men in the world who wish
to dwell on Argentine soil .... 
Until 1930 Argentina enjoyed a "seventy year unbroken stretch
of constitutional succession to the presidency."' But, by 1930,
domestic and foreign elements had conspired against the president,
17. Zalaquett, supra note 2, at 19.
18. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, at 3. See Snyder, State of Siege and Rule of Law In
Argentina: The Politics and Rhetoric of Vindication, 15 LAW AM. 503, 506 (1984). See also
Winizky, A Survey of Constitutional Developments In Argentina And Uraguay, 8 Sw. LJ. 418,
420-33 (1954) (for a discussion of the creation and history of the 130-year old Argentine
Constitution).
19. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, at 3. See G.l. BLANKSTEN, supra note 11, at 29-30.
See generally Quintana, Comparison Of The Constitutional Basis Of The United States And
Argentine Political Systems, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 641 (1949).
20. CONS'r. ARGENT.. supra note 12, art. 14, at 4-5.
21. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 16, at 5.
22. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 18, at 5.
23. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, at 3 (preamble).
24. D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 3. See also G.I. BLANKSTEN, supra note 11, at 30
wherein the author states that "[t]he period from 1853 until 1930 was, on the whole,
auspicious for the progressive development of the Argentine nation; and the republic was
favored, especially in the early portion of the period, by a succession of outstanding statesmen
occupying the presidency." kd
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Hip6lito Yrigoyen.1 When the Depression hit Argentina in 1929,
Yrigoyen was unprepared to handle the losses Argentina incurred
from a failing export market, the split of his Radical party and
violent opposition groups calling for immediate resolutions to the
crisis.' Especially disturbed was the military, which resented the
executive's use of the armed forces for routine interventions in the
provinces, Yrigoyen's disregard of regulations, his granting of favors
and re-enlistment of loyal retired officers.' Yrigoyen had upset
"what the majority of the military saw as the order, discipline and
balance of a hierarchical institution."' Pushed far enough, on
September 6, 1930, the military rolled in the tanks." Led by
General Jos6 F. Uriburu, ° the military staged a coup and toppled
the government of Hip6lito Yrigoyen. 1 The military coup was not
resisted by Yrigoyen or the people. 2 By that time the Yrigoyen
administration had virtually "disappeared."3
Until the coup, military power had been outwardly subordinate
to civilian authority.' The events of 1930 shifted this arrangement.35
25. See R. CRASSWELLER, supra note 15, at 55-63, 71-73 (1987), for information on the
background and presidency of Hip6lito Yrigoyen, who was elected president of Argentina in
1916.
26. Id. at 71.
27. Id. at 71-72.
28. 1& at 72.
29. See D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 3.
30. J.A. PAGE, supra note 13, at 28-31. General Josd F. Uriburu is described as a German-
trained cavalry officer and former conservative deputy (congressman) who led the nationalist
faction that overthrew Yrigoyen. Id. at 29. Following the coup, General Uriburu declared
himself president of Argentina. Id at 31. See D. RocK, ARGENTINA 1516-1985: FROM
SPANISH COLONIZATION To THE FALKLANDS WAR 215-16 (1985).
31. D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 3.
32. Id
33. G.I. BLANKsTEN, supra note 11, at 35. At the time, a political leader remarked that
"[o]n September 6, there was no ruler in the Casa Rosada except the doorman, who gave the
keys to the first people who presented themselves as occupants." Id at 35 n.26 (quoting
from E. DICKMANN, RECUERDOS DE UN MILrrANTE SOIALIsrA 309-10 (Buenos Aires: La
Vanguardia, 1949)).
34. R. CRASSWELLER, supra note 15, at 73. See also CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, arts.
23 & 24, at 13.
35. R. CRASSWELLER, supra note 15, at 73. Though claiming to be guardians of the
Constitution, the military, in reality, became another political force. See also G. WYNtA, supra
note 3, at 86-87.
[A]t one time or another members of the lower, middle, and upper classes, as well
as leaders of labor, industry, and agriculture, have turned to the armed forces for
help .... The military once responded cautiously... but when officers carried out
their first coup on September 6, 1930, they accepted new responsibilities, thereafter
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Rallying to the defense of law and constitution, the military became
"contenders in the political battleground rather than guardians well
above it."' Writer, Gary Wynia pointed out:
The coup set a precedent that would be emulated many times
afterward. By stepping in and taking it upon themselves to
"organize" the nation's affairs, the armed forces became a
legitimate participant in the nation's politics, one that every
interest would thereafter consider a potential ally. They had in
effect become the partido militar, a political organization with
commitments that obligated future generations of officers to
assume responsibility for the nation's governance whether in
office or not.37
The military would not be satisfied by a single tumble with
politics. Coups followed in 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, and 1976.8
Military and politics made vexing bedfellows. Marching in to
"restore order," the military only created disorder.39 Constitutional
becoming a self-proclaimed "guardian of the constitution" that considered itself above
civilian law.
Id.
36. R. CRASSWELLER, supra note 15, at 74.
37. G. WYNIA, supra note 3, at 88.
38. D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 4. For a discussion of the various coups see D. ROCK,
supra note 30, at 245-49 (1943 coup), 312-19 (1955 coup), 338-42 (1962 coup), 345-46 (1966
coup), 360-66 (1976 coup). Governments overthrown by military coups include those of
Hip6lito Yrigoyen (1930), Roberto Ortiz (1943), General Juan Per6n (1955), Arturo Frondizi
(1962), Arturo Illia (1966) and Isabel Per6n (who, as vice-president, succeeded her husband
as president when he died in 1974) (1976). G. WYNIA, supra note 3, at 46.
39. P. LERNOUX, CRY OF THE PEOPLE 200 (1982). The military has created problems in
the political, economic, and foreign arenas. In 1933 the military signed the Roca-Ronciman
Pact with Britain "under which Argentine beef was supplied to the British market at
unrealistically low prices, and the ad hoc tram and bus services in Buenos Aires were
dismantled so that British firms would have exclusive right to run a transport system in the
city." J. SIMPSON & J. BENNETr, supra note 10, at 50-51. Surprisingly, the Argentines
suggested these concessions. Id
Witness also how Argentina's 1982 invasion of the Falklands, conceived by the junta as
a "diverstionary gambit ...to unite the country behind the regime, turned into a bloody
disaster, exposing monumental diplomatic and military misjudgments on the part of the high
command." J.A. PAGE, supra note 13, at 501. As journalist Penny Lernoux has commented:
One of the basic issues so conveniently ignored is that the military governments
are a destabilizing force . . . . The constant intervention of the armed forces in
politics and government both overtly and covertly, has made civilian political
development virtually impossiblle .... The military had staged innumerable coups,
ousted elected Presidents, dismissed Congresses, changed and discarded constitutions,
1989] NOTES 359
guarantees were suspended nearly forty-five percent of the time
between 1930 and 1970.' Electoral fraud and violence were
employed to install conservative governments.4" Political parties
were shut out of the election process; opposition leaders were
arrested or exiled; police confiscated ballots; voting registers were
falsified; the dead were brought back to life to vote; voters were
bribed.4" Bombings and riots occurred daily.43 The army and police
were used often during campaigns to consolidate candidates'
positions." Argentine politics became a "matter of calculating the
number of tanks that [could] move against the Casa Rosada.""
Despite breaches of constitutional order, the Supreme Court
was forced to "recognize and 'legitimate"'" these de facto
governments in 1943, 1955, 1962 and 1966."7 The Court realized
these provisional governments were "backed by the military and
police power essentially to maintain peace and order"' and
acquiesced to their monopoly of power.49 Latin scholar Germain J.
Bidart Campos has said the Court's resolution "was an attempt to
imposed states of siege, closed universities, expelled and imprisoned political
opponents, and established censorship -- all this in addition to its own internal
feuding. "Law and order" is a myth ....
P. LERNOUX, supra, at 200.
40. Feinrider, supra note 6, at 187.
41. Cox, supra note 13, at 53.
42. D. RocK, supra note 30, at 214-17.
43. See G.I. BLANKSTEN, supra note 11, at 67-71.
44. Id at 67.
45. Cox, supra note 13, at 51. The Casa Rosada is Argentina's White House. G.I.
BLANKSTEN, supra note 11, at 33.
46. Feinrider, supra note 6, at 187.
47. Id
48. G.J. BIDART CAMPOS, THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT: THE COURT OF
CONSITrUTIONAL GUARANTEES 116 (W. J. Brisk trans. 1982).
The judiciary's role during these de facto regimes has been cautious. Soon after
seizing the presidential palace in September 6, 1930, General Jost F. tlriburu formally
notified the Court that he had set up a provisional government. The Court was faced
with three options: it could ignore the provisional government altogether, it could
challenge its legitimacy, or it could formally recognize the provincial government.
[The court chose the third option].
The high court ... wrestled with the consequences of recognizing a government
which had come to power following a patent breach of constitutional order in
deposing the elected government of President Yrigoyen. But the Court, as the only
remaining legitimate remnant of constitutional democracy, responded with both firmness
and prudence.
1 4 at 115-16 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
49. I d at 116.
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reconcile dedication to constitutional principles with practicality."5
While the Court acknowledged the authority of provisional
governments, it resolved to remain the "arbiter of constitutionality
and protector of personal rights."51 By implication, the Court
insisted the regimes obey judicial decisions." But, judicial strength
was sapped by purges in 1946, 1955, 1966, 1973 and 1976."3
Civilian governments were hardly distinguishable from those of
the military. 4 Acting as puppets of the military or dictators, civilian
rulers perpetuated the sham of democracy.
Lawyer and author, Daniel Poneman, described the circumstances
which result when a constitution becomes an instrument of personal
power:
A democracy must be ruled by laws, not men. Argentina has
been ruled by men, not laws. Every ursurper touts the
democratic 1853 Constitution, while breaking the most basic
rule of the game: governments must be chosen by voters, not
cabals . . . . To the extent he could get away with it, each
man became a law unto himself.6
IM. TIm Coup OF 1976
Against this background of "revolving-door politics," 7 the military
dislodged the government of Juan Per6n's" widow, Isabel, in March,
50. Id.
51. Id. at 117.
52. Id
53. Feinrider, supra note 6, at 187. After seizing power in 1976 and appointing General
Jorge R. Videla as president, the junta, by decree, dismissed the judges of the Superior
Courts in all the provinces and suspended life tenure. Id at 197. New judges replaced those
relieved. Id See also Human Rights in the World" Argentina, 16 INT'L COMMISSION JURISIS
1, 3 (1976) [hereinafter Human Rights].
54. Feinrider, supra note 6, at 186.
55. Id See also D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 39-40; G.I. BLANKSTEN, supra note 11, at 51.
56. D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 127.
57. G. WYNIA, supra note 3, at 195. Wynia refers to Argentine politics as being "quite
repetitive, the military coming and going at almost regular intervals and civilian governments
doing much the same." Id. at 45.
58. See J.A. PAGF, supra note 13 for a thorough biography of General Juan Per6n, who




Isabel's inability to control inflation, repair rifts within the
Peronist party, subdue violence and quell union strikes left her
without popular support.' Any authority Isabel enjoyed deteriorated
when Congress began impeachment proceedings against her for
diverting charitable funds to her personal account." The
disintegrating state of the nation presented a "classic scenario" once
more for a coup d'6tat.'
The military group inherited a troubled country. Terrorism
threatened many.' Chronic inflation soured the economy.'
Government control was eroding.' When the military took control,
the Argentines welcomed "a return to sanity"; gentleman would
govern Argentina again."
Members of the military, however, had .priorities beyond acting
mannerly. Interpreting its mission to end terrorism and repair the
economy as a mandate to remake the nation, the military junta
established the "Process of National Reorganization."67 A series of
59. Dworkin, supra note 9, at 11. See also Schumacher, Argentina and Democracy,
FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1984, at 1075.
60. D. RoCK, supra note 30, at 364-66.
61. Id at 366.
62. Id
63. See Elon, supra note 4, at 74-76. Although left-wing terrorism was chronic, author
Daniel Poneman suggests:
The terrorists' targets were generally security forces or prominent figures, so the man
in the street was not greatly threatened. The disappearances [caused by the military
and police forces] touched many more, but a shroud of silence allowed people to
fool themselves into thinking that the terror was an illusion or a minor excess above
a dirty but necessary task.
D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 38.
64. Schumacher, supra note 59, at 1075.
65. See D. ROCK, supra note 30, at 364.
66. Dworkin, supra note 9, at 11. See also G. WYNIA, supra note 3, at 99 wherein he states:
Support for military intervention is usually motivated by rather narrow, short-term
self-interests rather than philosophical convictions. Rampant inflation, working-class
protest, terrorism, or a bad business climate frighten them and alienate them from
weak civilian-run governments, prompting their acceptance of military intervention
as a necessary evil in times of crisis.
Id That Argentines can view the military as a "necessary evil" as well as "gentleman" is an
indication of the peculiar hold the military has over the country. When needed, the military
become "gentleman," but once in power, the "evil" side becomes apparent.
67. Statute For The Process of National Reorganization, B.O. (1978) English translation
reprinted in A. BLAUSTEIN & G. FLANZ, supra note 12, at 26 [hereinafter Statute for the
Process].
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decrees' were issued in which the junta "assumed the principle
powers of the Executive and Legislative branches of the Argentine
government."' Congress was dissolved." The junta was empowered
to appoint the president and replace the Supreme Court.7' The
president was granted legislative powers.' Provincial governments
were displaced.73 Political parties were banned.74 Union activity was
curtailed. 5  Newspapers were closed or censored.' Moral codes
were imposed on the Arts.' Student unions were silenced.78
Teachers were dismissed.' Books were destroyed.' Educational
curricula were modified." Restrictions on religious practice were
imposed. 2 Friends were rewarded, enemies were persecuted.'
Through these decrees, the military effectively subverted the
Constitution into theory and became "the judge and jury of national
politics."' Indeed, the most "basic right -- the right to life -- lacked
effective protection from either the courts, the bar, the parties, or
popular opinion."' Determined to end terrorism, the junta
embarked on a fierce attack on subversion of any kind.' "Tens of
thousands of citizens were abducted by security forces, beaten,
tortured, raped, and held prisoner in clandestine detention centers
68. See Report of the Mission of Lawyers to Argentina: April 1-7, 1979, 34 REc. A. B. City
N.Y. 473, 476, 493 n.23 (1979) [hereinafter Mission of Lawyers]. See also Snyder, supra note
18, at 508-09.
69. Mission of Lawyers, supra note 68, at 476.
70. Id.
71. Statute for the Process, supra note 67, arts. 1 & 2, at 26-27. See also Mission of
Lawyers, supra note 68, at 476-77.
72. Statute for the Process, supra note 67, art. 5, at 28. See also Mission of Lawyers, supra
note 68, at 477.
73. D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 35.
74. J. SIMPSON & J. BENNETT, supra note 10, at 40.
75. Id.
76. Id at 231-48.
77. Id at 210, 219-30.
78. Human Rights, supra note 53, at 3.
79. Id. at 212-15.
80. Id at 210, 216-17.
81. Id at 212-15.
82. Id at 215-16, 249-67.
83. See D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 8.
84. Id at 40.
85. Id
86. Id at 35-37. See also Mission of Layers, supra note 68, at 477.
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or simply killed outright."'7 Access to courts was almost impossible
since the junta severely restricted the right to habeas corpus.ss
Defense lawyers risked death or disappearance if they represented
"subversives."'" Constitutional protections were suspended "in favor
of the terrifying logic of 'national security. '"'
The imminence of the terrorist threat did not justify "the
abdication of all responsibility to decide who shall live and who shall
die to an uncontrolled group of soldiers and maruaders beholden
only to themselves. It cannot excuse torture and murder even of the
guilty without benefit of legal procedures.""
IV. THE DuTY WAR
The major focus of the junta's "process" was to eliminate
subversion.' Since the death of Juan Per6n in 1974, violence by
left and right-wing factions raged." When Isabel succeeded her
husband as president, she failed to control the violence.' By 1976,
when the military siezed power, "the battle between state security
forces and the country's many and varied guerrilla groups was
87. Tweedy, The Argentine "Dirty Wars" Tials: The First Latin American Nuremberg?, 44
NAVL L. GUILD PRAc. 15, 16 (1987).
88. Feinrider, supra note 6, at 196-97.
89. J. SIMPSON & J. BENNEr, supra note 10, at 72.
90. Tweedy, supra note 87, at 15.
91. D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 39 (emphasis added).
92. Id at 35.
93. Mission of Lawyers, supra note 68, at 476. See also Dworkin, supra note 9, at 11.
Several revolutionary groups emerged in the late 1960's and early 1970's. D. ROCK, supra
note 30, at 353. Three Peronist factions were the Monteneros, Fuerzas Armadias Peronistas
(FAP), and Fuerzas Armadias Revolucionaries (FAR). Id. These groups united under the
Monteneros in 1973. Id. A more anti-Peronist leftist group, the People's Revolutionary Party
(ERP), emerged in 1970. Id. To combat these guerrilla groups, the government organized
its own para-police force, the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance, or as commonly known,
the Triple A. G. WYNIA, supra note 3, at 81. By 1974 most of the kidnappings and murders
were the work of these Triple A death squads. See D. ROCK, supra note 30, at 360. By the
end of 1976 both the ERP and the Monteneros were destroyed. J. SIMPSON & J. BENNErr,
supra note 10, at 28. When the junta assumed control in 1976, the Triple A was not a target
of its attack on subversion. Mission of Lawyers, supra note 68, at 476, 493 n.21 (citing
AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION To ARGENTINA 35 (1977)).
Left-wing terrorist orgnanizations were the subversives, and, as the Argentine Foreign Minister
said: "Subversion or terrorism of the right is not the same thing." Id.
94. Dworkin, supra, note 9, at 11.
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claiming hundreds of lives a week.""
For the military, World War III had begun." The enemy was
not a foreign army. The enemy was the corrupt and subversive
behavior of Argentines themselves.' Only the armed forces could
protect the nation.' "Unconventional means were needed to fight
an unconventional enemy; they would use terror to fight terror.""
With impunity, the military mimicked the terrorists."° A state terror
network developed."'1 Didionesque phrases appeared to describe the
process:
Per6n's guerrilla supporters did not kill or murder, they
"applied justice." Later the Montoneros became "special
formations," to distinguish them from the ERP cadres, who
were simply "terrorists." Anyone who opposed the military
regime, from a committed terrorist to a non-violent dissident.
. . as well as anyone who did not publicly support it, from a
critical journalist to a questioning schoolteacher, was a
"subversive." And subversives could be "eliminated" by the
"forces of order," with no questions asked."°
The junta sought to "eliminate physically all those who in any
way participated in the world it wanted to modify." 3 The military's
counterattack against subversion:
95. Cox, supra note 13, at 54. See generally D. ROCK, supra note 30, at 346-69; J.A. PAGE
supra note 13, at 363-49, 4%-501.
96. Lernoux, Can Alfonsin Survive? The Threats to Argentine Democracy, THE NATION, Feb.
2, 1985, at 114.
97. See G. WYNIA, supra note 3, at 100.
98. Id. at 88. The military contends only they, "with their code of honor, patriotism, and
superior sense of organization and discipline, could provide the leadership necessary to bring
about national revitalization." Id. at 95.
99. Schumacher, supra note 59, at 1076.
100. See Cox, Total Terrorism:Argentina; 1969-1979, TERRORISM, LEGITMACY, AND POWER:
THE CONSEQUENSES OF POLmCAL VIOLENCE 140 (M. Crenshaw ed. 1983).
101. Schumacher, supra note 59, at 1076. See also P. LERNOUX, supra note 39, at 9-10,
wherein Penny Lernoux describes a "vast network of government spies, secret police, and
para-police operations with their attendant torture chambers and death squads." Id. at 10.
102. Cox, supra note 13, at 54. "Didionesque" refers to the writing style of author Joan
Didion, whose works include SLOUCHING TOWARD BETHLEHEM (1968), THE WHITE ALBUM
(1979), SALVADOR (1983), DEMOCRACY (1984), and MIAMI (1987).
103. 3. TIMERMAN, PRISONER WITHOUT A NAME, CELL WrTHOUT A NUMBER 95 (1981).
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extended to sympathizers and fellow travelers, to the
disseminators of ideas the armed forces found uncongenial,
and to foreign refugees and political activists who might be
suspect. The army understood that the net of repression cast
so wide, would certainly bring in many who were marginal or
entirely innocent; it did not welcome this prospect, but it
accepted it, deeming it inevitable since the state had to be
preserved and there was insufficient time and manpower (and
in some cases, desire) to fine-tune the process.1
By the end of 1977, the left-wing guerrilla movement was
quashed.1" Though an "internal directive issued by the army itself'
had estimated the "enemy" to be only 300-500 in number, repression
remained pervasive."° Three-quarters of the political deaths in 1976
were attributed to individuals from the extreme right."7 None were
arrested or tried."° "On the contrary, the government gave dozens
of paramilitary and para-police organizations a free hand to torture,
murder, and blackmail their victims: thuggery was thus
institutionalized on a national scale.""°  The savagery of the
terrorists shrank in comparison to "official barbarism.""' Argentina
104. R. CRASSWELLER, supra note 15, at 371. The repression initially aimed a left-wing
terrorists and students "expanded to include union leaders, moderate politicians, lawyers,
journalists, scientists, priests, even right-wing businessmen. It was enough to deplore the
carnage to become a victim." P. LERNOUX, supra note 39, at 336.
105. P. LERNOUX, supra note 39, at 335.
106. Comment, Judgment of Former Military Rulers for Human Rights Violations: Jorge R.
Videlo e. alia, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. Rms. ANN. 809, 827 (1987); P. LERNOUX, supra note 39,
at 335.
107. Id. at 335.
108. Id.
109. Id. See also G. WYNILA, supra note 3, at 82 wherein the author explains the military's
system to eliminate terrorism:
In the past when terrorists were caught they were sent to prison, where they were
tortured but usually kept alive. Not any longer. On orders from the highest command,
military intelligence and paramilitary units abducted whomever they wished (averaging
fifteen per day during the last quarter of 1976), took them to secret concentrations
camps, tortured them for information about their colleagues, and then killed them
without even recording their deaths.
Id.
110. Cox, supra note 100, at 124. See also Tweedy, supra note 87, at 25. The National
Commission on Disappeared Persons (CODEP), appointed by Argentina's current president
Raul Alfonsfn to investigate the thousands of disappearances during the "dirty war,"
concluded, in September, 1984, that "the armed forces responded to the terrorists' crimes with
a terrorism infinitely worse than that which they were combating." National Commission of
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became a "terrorist state without terrorists"'111 by 1979. Jungle justice
had triumphed, but the nightmare continued.
V. WORKING Wm THiE CONSTurONAL
FRAMEWORK
Upon taking power, the junta assumed the authority to enact
measures to combat terrorism and install order."' The military
government claimed power from constitutional sources as well as
self-perpetuated rules of questionable legality. 13  That these
measures could appear legitimate and legal was due both to the
ambiguity of the Constitution and the loopholes created by certain
provisions of the document."'
The Argentine Constitution provides for a strong executive.1
As "[s]upreme head of the nation," 6 the president possesses a wide
array of authority. He may propose law, veto legislation, issue
decrees that have the force of law, and appoint and remove cabinet
ministers and other administrators without consulting Congress. 17 In
addition, the Constitution permits the executive to declare a "state
of siege""' and to "intervene" in a province to "guarantee the
republican form of government." 9
The legislature, though, is weak compared to the executive."
Overwhelmed by presidential powers, Congress plays second fiddle,
Disappeared Persons (CODEP), reprinted in J. SIMPSON & J. BENNETT, supra note 10, at 339.
111. Cox, supra note 100, at 124.
112. See Statute for the Process, supra note 67, at 26-30 and accompanying text.
113. See Dworkin, supra note 9, at 14.
114. See Note, Similarities And Differences In Letter And Spirit Between The Constitution
Of The United States And Argentina, 40 GEo. LJ. 582, 595 (1952).
115. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 86, at 17. See also J.A. PAGE, supra note- 13,
at 162.
116. CONsT. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 86, at 17.
117. Id. See also J. BRUCE, THOSE PERPLEXING ARGENTINES 266-67 (1953).
118. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 23, at 6.
119. CONsT. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 6, at 4.
120. D. PONEMAN supra note 5, at 130.
Partly by design and partly by custom, the Argentine National Congress is less active
than reactive. Lack of practice has worsened the problem. During the first two
Peronist presidencies, the Radical block in Congress faced the dilemma of making
little difference or making no difference when faced by large Peronist majorities and
a president who jailed Radical leaders. Military governments resolve this cruel
choice by dissolving the Congress.
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rarely able to assert "independent power . . . to defend the
Constitution.""' Any system of checks and balances, crucial to
federalism, is thwarted. t"
Together, these powers (or lack thereof) have been used to
undermine democracy in Argentina." The continued exercise of
executive prerogative by leaders has exacted a high price from the
Argentines. Article 14 of the Argentine Constitution guarantees
rights among others, to assemble, petition authorities, and publish
ideas.2 4 Yet, these rights are restricted by the qualifying words "in
accordance with the laws that regulate their exercise.""z Through
decrees issued under the "Process of National Reorganization," the
junta promulgated such regulatory laws." The potential for abuse
proved deadly to the constitutional process. Divining a right to run
the country, the junta availed itself of these constitutional
weaknesses to promote its peculiar vision of the way the Argentine
world should be."27
A. Intervention
Article 6 of the Constitution is a general power which permits
the federal government to intervene in a province "to guarantee the
republican form of government or repel foreign invasion.""
Intervention has occured so frequently in Argentina that even by
1917 one commentator stated:
121. Id.
122. See J.A PAGE, supra note 13, at 162.
123. Id.
124. CONsT. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 14, at 4.
125. Id. See Note, supra note 114, at 595.
126. See Snyder, supra note 18, at 509. An example of such a decree was the "Act to
Consider the Conduct of those Persons Who Prejudice the Higher Interests of the Nation."
Id. at 509 n.26 (quoting from the act). The junta assumed "the power and responsibility to
review the actions of those individuals who have injured the national interest." Id.
127. See Lernoux, supra note 96, where journalist Penny Lernoux describes the military's
vision:
The military leaders inhabit a dark, conspiratorial world in which social realities
rarely intrude. They propound a pseudo-fascist theory called the Doctrine of National
Security, which holds that World War III has already begun and that the Christian
forces of the West are locked in a struggle with communism. The enemy is anyone
who thinks differently from them; so to save Argentina, the military must wipe out
all signs of dissent.
Id at 114. See also Zalaquett, supra note 2, at 18-19.
128. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 6, at 4.
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In a word, federal intervention is accepted willingly .... [I]n
the political field, the federal intervention is also accepted with
great pleasure, whenever it benefits the party to which one
belongs; and thus there is no governor, no legislature, no
faction of a provincial legislature, which does not turn its eyes
to the President of the Republic or to Congress whenever they
feel weak or in danger.'"
By 1953, every president had intervened in at least one
province.' Through intervention, allies replaced political enemies,
and faultering presidencies were saved. 3' The purpose of
intervention has thus been distorted for political benefit.'
Intervention results in the "supression of the provincial
constitution" and the removal of "legislative, executive and judicial
authorities" in the province. 33  The federal government then
exercises authority through a presidential official who is answerable
only to the executive."
Although intervention is supposed to be a temporary measure,
any check on this power was effectively barred when the Supreme
Court ruled that the decision to intervene was a non-justiciable
political question.35  The Court would not "pass judgment on the
wisdom, necessity or proper duration of national intervention in any
instance."" With that decision, the intervenor system "stood as a
ready-made instrument of dictatorship at the disposal of the military
men."
37
Military regimes proceeded to intervene routinely,"~ leaving the
provinces with so little autonomy that they resembled "occupied
countries rather than free states.' 139 With Congress usually dissolved
129. Quintana, supra note 19, at 650 n.33 (quoting MATIENZO, EL GOBIERNO
REPRESENTATIVO FEDERAL EN LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA (2d ed. 1917)).
130. See G.I. BLANKSTEN, supra note 11, at 139.
131. See D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 129.
132. See Winizky, supra note 18, at 432.
133. G.I. BLANKSrEN, supra note 11, at 138-39.
134. Id. at 139.
135. Id. at 138.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 139.




and the Court without jurisdiction, two crucial checks on executive
authority were silenced.
Additionally, key phrases in Article 6 such as "federal
government" and "republican form of government" are undefined in
the text.'O The vagueness of these terms raises questions: Does
"federal government" mean the branches of the government act
together or separately in deciding when to intervene? If together,
how is agreement to intervene to be reached? If separate, which
branch is authorized to order intervention? What does "republican
form of government" mean and who determines its meaning?
Evidently much was left open for the junta to define. Thus, Article
6, in effect, served as a dangerous catch-all for the junta to interpret
as it desired and to act as it pleased, unhampered by textual
limitations.
B. State of Seige
Article 23 of the Argentine Constitution allows a "state of siege"
to be declared in an area, if "internal disorder or foreign attack"
endangers "the operation of this Constitution and the authorities
created thereby."14  If a "state of siege" is declared, then
Constitutional guarantees are suspended in that territory.1
42
The clause identifies the limits within which the president may
act during a state of siege:
[D]uring such suspension the President of the Republic shall
not convict or apply punishment upon his own authority. His
power shall be limited in such a case, with respect to persons,
to arresting them or transferring them from one point of the
Nation to another, if they do not prefer to leave Argentine
territory.
143
Argentine citizens enjoy many rights and protections under the
Constitution.'" Article 23 "has made a mockery of these noble
140. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 6, at 4.
141. CONsr. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 23, at 6.
142. Id. See also Snyder, supra note 18, at 509-10.
143. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 23, at 6.
144. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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protections."14 Other democracies have "tinkered with constitutional
safeguards during periods of domestic upheaval,"1" but reluctantly
and cautiously.147 However, in Argentina, such incursions are
predictable." By 1949, states of siege had been pronounced over
thirty times. 49 Declared for a variety of reasons, ranging from riots
and strikes to the invasion of Pearl Harbor, states of siege have
lasted for long and short intervals."' In 1969 President Ongania 5 '
imposed a state of siege that ran almost four years.' Before the
elections in 1973 it was lifted."5 3 But late in 1974, Isabel Per6n
instituted another that lasted until election day in 1983.'
Theoretically, Article 23 defines boundaries for presidential
action: arrests and transfers are permitted, however, punishment is
prohibited.' According to Article 86, when there is a foreign
invasion, the president declares a state of siege with the consent of
the Senate."" The Senate, through Article 53, can authorize the
president to declare a state of siege if there is a foreign invasion. 57
With internal disorder, the president has "power only when the
Congress is in recess," since this is a power belonging to that body."'8
Pursuant to Article 67, Congress is empowered to declare a state of
siege "in case of internal disturbance, and to approve or suspend a
state of siege declared by the Executive during a recess of the
Congress."5 9 Theoretically then, the president cannot authorize
145. D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 130.
146. Snyder, supra note 18, at 506.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Quintana, supra note 19, at 648-49.
150. D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 131.
151. See D. RocK, supra note 30, at 346-55. General Juan Carlos Onganla, former Army
Chief of Staff, led a coup in 1966 that overthrew President Arturo Illia. Id. at 346.
Onganfa's presidency was characterized by violence and repression. Id. at 347. In 1970 he
was removed by a military coup that installed General Roberto M. Levingston as president.
Id. at 355.
152. D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 131.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. CONSr. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 23, at 6. See also infra notes 185-208 and
accompanying text.
156. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 86, § 19, at 18.
157. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 53, at 10.
158. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 86, § 19, at 18.
159. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 67, § 26, at 13.
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much unilaterally. If the country is invaded, he must receive the
Senate's consent or authorization.'" If internal disorder threatens
the country, Congress must be reckoned with at some point.'61
In practice, however, this legislative check is useless since, in
Argentina, Congress is often in "permanent" recess -- dissolved by
the ruling regime.6 The president alone is left to define what is an
emergency and to decide when one exists. Indeed, when carried
out, without effective review, this power serves to "free the
government from restraint and strip the citizen of protection."'"
The legal system of a nation can become a "tool of tyranny.""6 The
ambiguity of the text enables regimes to invoke the clause in times
of national emergency to "create a legal image for itself, or rather,
an image of the power it is exercising as 'legal,' Le., as grounded in
law."65 During troubled periods, when constitutional claims are
tested, the state of siege prerogative increases opportunity for
manipulation and disregard of liberties.'" Since the Constitution
does not designate a time limit, the state of siege can continue
indefinitely.
Ironically, though executive discretion to authorize a state of
siege is quite limited in Argentina, presidents declare states of siege
freely, seemingly unencumbered by constitutional restraints. 67 Even
if the "state of siege" articles did preclude presidential initiative, the
open-ended language of Article 6, which permits intervention,
probably would allow the president to achieve similar results.'"
The junta used this "apparatus of legality"'" freely while it
governed. Immediately following the coup, the junta announced
that the state of siege imposed by Isabel Per6n would continue. 7
Promising to safeguard individual rights, the new president, General
160. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 86, f 19, art. 53, at 18, 10.
161. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 86, § 19, at 18, art. 67, § 26, at 13.
162. D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 130.
163. Id. at 131.
164. Id.
165. Snyder, supra note 18, at 507.
166. See D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 131.
167. See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
168. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 6, at 4.
169. Snyder, supra note 18, at 507.
170. Mission of Lawyers, supra note 68, at 476.
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Jorge Rafael Videla, stated:
[W]e assume the full exercise of authority; not to infringe upon
liberty, but to affirm it; not to twist justice but to impose it.
After reestablishing an effective authority, which will be
revitalized at all levels, we will turn to the organization of the
state, whose performance will be based on permanence and
stability of judicial norms which will guarantee the primacy of
law and the observance of it by the governors and governed
alike."
Through the "Process of National Reorganization," the junta
determined to fulfill its mission. The "Statute for the Process of
National Reorganization" articulated the norms by which the
government would rule and society would live."r  But, President
Videla's words took on macabre meanings when actions followed.
Exercising authority meant the junta operated as the exclusive source
of law. Affirming liberty meant restrictions on individual rights and
repression. Imposing justice meant torture and disappearance.
Revitalizing authority meant dismissing officials. Organizing the state
meant dissolving federal and provincial bodies. Judicial permanence
and stability meant purging the Supreme Court. Primacy of law
meant the Constitution was to "remain in effect only 'to the extent
that it [did] not oppose the main objectives set forth by the military
junta or the provisions' of the law."174
Although the emergency power licensed by the Constitution
offered adequate legal means to enforce order,75 the junta required
more. Article 23 proscriptions were manipulated to broaden the
military's reach over citizens who could not be called criminals, yet
were equally reprehensible to the junta.76 In addition to using the
171. General Jorge Rafael Videla, former teacher and head of Colegio Militar, became
commander-in-chief of the army in 1975. G. WYNIA, supra note 3, at 100. Following the
1976 coup, he was appointed president of Argentina by the junta. Id. at 101.
172. Snyder, supra note 18, at 508 (emphasis added).
173. See Statute for the Process, supra note 67, at 26.
174. Snyder, supra note 18, at 509.
175. See Comment, supra note 106, at 826. These legal means included executive arrest
pursuant to Article 23, use of the right of option constitutionally mandated under state of
siege, and adherence to the United Nations Charter and Geneva Convention of 1949
regarding legal obligations owed prisoners of war. Id. at 18.
176. See supra notes 92-111 and accompanying text.
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existing Penal Code the junta introduced new crimes and harsher
penalties.1" Pursuant to the "Act to Consider the Conduct of Those
Persons Who Prejudice the Higher Interests of the Nation," the
junta parlayed "the power and reponsibility to review the actions of
those individuals who have injured the national interest." 8
Government action became necessary if negligence in public,
political, or social duties was found; subversive acts were committed;
administrative corruption was discovered or tolerated; or moral
principles were compromised by political or professional activities."
Behavior previously lawful was deemed criminal. Statutes
declared participation in political parties1" and labor strikes"' illegal.
Publication of news recounting "terrorist activity, subversion,
abductions or the discovery of bodies, unless officially announced,"'
was banned. Political criticism was forbidden."a The scope of the
Penal Code was expanded to increase the severity of certain crimes:
[A] breach of the peace punishable by a fine or 30 days
confinement became a federal offense punishable by
imprisonment for up to ten years. The sentence for the old
crime of 'illicit association' rose from 3-8 years to 5-12 years.
The death penalty, abolished in 1972, was revived, and would
now be carried out within 48 hours of the sentence, leaving
little time to file an appeal. The age of majority for criminal
responsibility was reduced from 18 to 16 years for certain
crimes."
By either ignoring, evading or distorting the proscriptions of
Article 23, the junta stretched its authority. The language of the
text became a toy to contort according to need. Since conviction
and punishment were prohibited, sanctions short of punishment were
administered."t Lesser penalties included "loss of political or union
177. See infra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
178. Snyder, supra note 18, at 509 n.26.
179. Id.





185. Id. at 509.
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rights; loss of citizenship for naturalized Argentinians;
disqualification from public office; and confinement."' Laws were
promulgated granting "extraordinary powers of arrest, detention and
interrogation" 7 to the armed forces, security groups and ordinary
police." Security forces could fire on individuals who breached the
peace and failed to stop after being warned once.'" Those confined
were interrogated and held for infinite duration, waiting for evidence
to accumulate against them.Y Their other choice was to go before
military tribunals for summary proceedings.' Conversely, the
military and police forces were subject only to military jurisdiction
for infractions committed on duty.Y Any violent act against such
officers was subject to severe penalties. Effectively immune from
prosecution, the military and police could "roam city streets at will,
veritable sovereignties in competition only with each other."93
Rights supposedly protected even during a state of siege were
trampled."M According to the Constitution, persons arrested by the
president during a state of emergency can elect to leave the
country.' This "right of option," conferred by Article 23, was
suspended by the junta."9 Although this complete suspension was
modified in 1977, the new procedures limited the detainee's exercise
of the right."7  A presidential veto could prevent exile if the
detainee "would endanger the peace and security of the nation if
permitted to leave" ArgentinaY Long periods of time could elapse
between arrest, request to leave, denial by the president, and
186. Id. at 509-10
187. K. PEHME, ARGENTINA'S DAYS OF RAGE: THE GENESIS OF ARGENTINE TERRORISM 68
(1980).
188. The powers extended to these groups were "extraordinary" because Article 23 bars
executive conviction or punishment on its own authority. See CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12,
art. 23, at 6. In addition the Supreme Court has held that only the president can order arrest
and he may not delegate such power. 235 Fallos 355, 252 Fallos 90 (cited in G.J. BIDART
CAMPOS, supra note 48, at 102) (emphasis added).




193. Id. at 511-12.
194. See D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 131.
195. CONST. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 23, at 6.
196. Mission of Lawyers, supra note 68, at 477.




submission of a new request.'
The "unconditional grant" of the option to leave, in Article 23,
raised questions about the legitimacy of suspending the right.'
National security concerns were recited again to justify yet another
restraint on individual liberty." Arguably, with the domestic war
against subversion going on, these expletives sounded more like the
messages of legalistic vigilantees than the assurances of patriotic
protectors. In this light, the validity of curbing the right of option
was suspect.
Violence done to individual rights was due in part to the junta's
brazen disregard of the law. Admittedly, constitutional defects and
ambiguities made these rights vulnerable to encroachment.
Specifically, Article 23 established no time limit on the duration of
a state of siege.' Denial of constitutional guarantees could
continue for years. 3 Without a right to leave, detention could go
on eternally.' Because "conviction" and "punishment" were vague
and undefined, they could be creatively interpreted.' Conflicts with
the language of the article could be avoided by a turn of phrase.
Alternative sanctions often sounded better, but when inflicted, were
more punishing. People in Argentina were not "convicted" or
"punished"; they were "detained" and "tortured."' They
"disappeared." 7 "Transfer," allowed under a state of siege, "became
synonymous with 'execution."'"z
Changes in jargon, however, could not alter the essence of
lawlessness. Constitutional ambiguity could not justify heinous
excess.
[T]here was a law within a law, for a state within a state. Or,
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. These concerns are reflected in the Code of Crim. Proc., Law No. 21,650, (Sept. 1,
1977) which stated that a president could veto a person's "right of option" if a detainee
"would endanger the peace and security of the nation if permitted to leave Argentine
territory." Mission of Layers, supra note 68, at 482.






208. Id. at 131-32.
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more accurately, a sphere of utter lawlessness beneath the
facade of an official lawlessness bankrupt of any real content.
The one a mask to disguise the other, grinning its ghoulish
grin at all those who still held dear some hope and faith in
the virtue and power of mere legality.'
VL THE JUDIcIAL DnmjmA
The Supreme Court in Argentina, as the United States Supreme
Court, is arbiter of constitutional meaning.21 However, in practice,
"the underlying legal culture . . . is one of idealism, legalism,
formalism, and lack of penetration.""21 Repeated purges, attacks, and
threats have gutted judicial strength.12 As targets themselves, the
courts were unable to effectively counter the strong-arm of military
governments.1 3  Given the choice between compromise or
annihilation, the Supreme Court delivered assertive opinions, but
assented to military dominance. 14
Government succession in Argentina rarely flows according to
constitutional procedures.1 ' De facto governments, installed by
military coups, have interrupted the constitutional scheme. 2  The
Supreme Court has addressed the constitutional dilemma presented
by these governments by developing a "de facto doctrine."1 7  In
exchange for a promise from the government to respect the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has recognized these
governments.218 Faced with the first of these regimes, the Court had
few options.
If it held the usurpation unconstitutional, its decision
209. Snyder, supra note 18, at 512.
210. Quintana, supra note 19, at 656.
211. Feinrider, supra note 6, at 175 n.20 (citing K. KARsr & K. ROSENN, LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1975)).
212. Id. at 187.
213. Id. at 198-99.
214. Id. at 175.
215. Quintana, supra note 19, at 657.
216. Feinrider, supra note 6, at 175.
217. Quintana, supra note 19, at 658.
218. Feinrider, supra note 6, at 193.
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(unsupported by physical force) could be ignored and the
judges (unprotected by physical force) could well be dismissed,
thereby depriving them of the opportunity to try to keep a
modicum of constitutional control over the new, de facto
government. On the other hand, if it adopted the so-called
"de facto doctrine," which held that governments
unconstitutional in origin could be constitutional in practice, it
would set a dangerous precedent (that coups are constitutional)
and compromise its image as an independent branch of
government .... In a one-page opinion, the Court upheld
the de facto doctrine, thereby ratifying the illegal
government.219
A dangerous precedent in fact was set. In 1943, 1955, 1962, and
1966 the Court "recognized" de facto governments.
The judicial system was further weakened by en masse
impeachments. 1 Though judicial power is supposed to remain in
force even during a state of siege,' in 1976, the junta dismissed and
replaced the Supreme Court and all Superior Tribunals of the
provinces,' despite life tenure.'
While the Supreme Court, in earlier cases, interpreted Article
23 to permit extraordinary powers during emergencies, in Juan C.
Rodriguez, the Court held that a state of siege "does not suspend
the constitution nor does it eliminate constitutional guarantees; the
separation of powers continues and the judiciary remains responsible
for sentencing criminals."' In Avico V. de la Pesa, ' the dissent
stated that "an emergency does not create new powers or even
increase them, nor does it diminish rights accorded by law; it only
justifies the exercise of those powers which are expressly or
219. D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 134 n.10 (citing 158 Fallos 290). See also GJ. BIDART
CAMPOS, supra note 48, at 115-17.
220. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
221. D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 134.
222. GJ. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 48, at 100
223. Feinrider, supra note 6, at 196.
224. CONsT. ARGENT., supra note 12, art. 96, at 20.
225. 250 Fallos 116 (1962) (cited in G.J. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 48, at 100).
226. Id.
227. 254 Fallos 116 (1962) (cited in GJ. BIDART CAMiOS, supra note 48, at 100).
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implicitly authorized in the Constitution."' Article 23 has not been
interpreted as suspending the Constitution completely. Indeed, the
Court has insisted that during a state of siege, the Constitution must
survive.' 9
Resolutions passed during states of seige which would
significantly abridge the structure of political authority were found
to contravene the "very essence of the Constitution"'  and thus
beyond the intent of Article 23. In addition, the Supreme Court
held that "the president could not delegate his power to arrest and
transfer citizens."z" Despite this nondelegation rule, the presidents,
during the "dirty war," delegated authority and "allowed the struggle
against subversion to be waged without his knowledge by
autonomous 'cells,' which were thought necessary to prevent
infiltration in the security forces and to fight the guerrillas on equal
terms." '
A formidable constitutional check to the junta's excesses was
removed when the Supreme Court refused to review the legitimacy
of states of seige. The Court held the decision to enforce a state
of seige to be a non-justiciable political question. 3 Some progress
was made in 1959 when the Court, in Antonia Sofia,' suggested
that although the declaration of a state of seige was not reviewable,
the test of reasonableness should be used in reviewing specific
executive measures not related to restoring order.us But, executive
restraints on individual rights directly connected to the internal
disorder were not reviewable.' In 1972, the Court, in Daniel
Mallo,u37 held that under a state of seige only "some rights and
guarantees may be temporarily restricted - those which are
incompatible in each case with the domestic or external threats to
order."'  In 1977, the Court, in Carlos Mariano Zamoranoz' 9
228. Id.
229. Snyder, supra note 18, at 512.
230. Id. at 512-13. See also GJ. BIDART CAMpOS, supra note 48, at 100.
231. D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 132.
232. Id.
233. GJ. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 48, at 100.
234. 243 Fallos 504 (1959) (cited in GJ. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 48, at 101).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 282 Fallos 392 (1972) (quoted in G.J. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 48, at 103-04).
238. Id.
239. 298 Fallos 441 (1977) (cited in GJ. BIDART CAMpOS, supra note 48, at 104).
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decided that arrests during a state of seige could be challenged by
habeas corpus petitions.' Prior to this case these executive arrests
were not reviewable unless the prisoner's Article 23 right of option
was denied. 41 But, in Zamorano, the Court held:
Specific applications of the President's exceptional powers to
suspend constitutional freedoms are subject to judicial review
which, far from disappearing during emergencies, must be
developed to the point that it satisfies both juridictional
requirements and Argentine social values which are placed in
its care .... [The judiciary has] a duty to determine whether
the severity of the restrictions bears a reasonable relationship
with the state of emergency .... .4
Based on this decision, presidents are required to submit precise
reasons for detention to enable judges to determine the
"reasonableness" of the executive's use of emergency powers.243
Although this obligation was designed to limit executive discretion
during a state of seige, the courts have allowed imprisonment merely
upon executive assertions of subversion without verifying such
allegations.2' Here, again, the Court treated the executive's
conclusions as political matters beyond the purview of judicial
review." Thus, not only was the possibility of enforcing these
decisions unlikely when the enforcers, who wielded the power, were
not inclined to agree with the Court, but the Court itself conceded
the fight with empty maxims.' s
A safeguard available under judicial power was the writ of habeas
corpus; however, the junta curbed this right by declaring detainees




243. Id. at 105. See also Snyder, supra note 18, at 514.
244. G.J. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 48, at 105-06.
245. Id. at 106.
246. See D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 136-37. See also Feinrider, supra note 6, at 196-97.
247. Feinrider, supra note 6, at 1%-97 n.185 (citing Attacks on the Independence of Judges
& Lawyers in Argentina, 1 BULL. CENTRE INDEPENDENT JUDGES & LAW. 1 (1978)). See also
Plight of Defense Lawyers in Argentina, 14 INT'L COMMISSION JURISTS 1 (1975).
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petitions for habeas corpus frequently, the military and police
refused to cooperate.' Whether officially held (detenidos) or
disappeared allegedly without government knowledge (desparacidos),
recourse to the courts by the detainees' families was almost futile. 9
When people disappear, when knowledge of them is denied, when
records do not exist -- how can a safeguard requiring the existence
of a body and the identification of a responsible official be helpful?
The courts stayed open during the years of repression from 1976
to 1983. But the few habeas corpus writs granted amounted to a
"figleaf, a 'discourse of rationality,' that the military government
could point to in defending its record. Freedom granted one victim
obscured perdition for thousands."'
The judicial process was incapable of restraining executive
power." t Often cited to exemplify the breakdown in justice was the
Court's tolerance of the junta's use of Article 23 to detain
thousands, while suspending the right of option afforded by the
same provision." The legality of the junta's exercise of authority
was never discussed.2" The legality of the overthrow of the Per6n
government and the continuation of the state of seige was never
addressed." The Court refused to review emergencies declared by
the executive, which called for a state of seige, because this exercise
of Article 23 power was considered a non-justiciable political
question.2" The only judge to declare the state of seige
unconstitutional fled the country right after he decided the case."'
The ravage and pillage set was too great a threat even for an
"equal" branch of the government. Judges and bar members were
removed, murdered, or disappeared.257 By trying to protect and save
248. Feinrider, supra note 6, at 197.
249. Id. See also J. SIMPSON & J. BNNENrI, supra note 10, at 70-73.
250. D. PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 132.
251. See J.A. PAGE, supra note 13, at 166.
252. Mission of Lawyers, supra note 68, at 482.
253. Snyder, supra note 18, at 17.
254. Id.
255. 170 Fallos 246, 195 Fallos 439, 235 Fallos 681, 246 Fallos 205, 252 Fallos 244 (cited
in GJ. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 48, at 100). See also Snyder, supra note 18, at 517.
256. Snyder, supra note 18, at 517.
257. Feinrider, supra note 6, at 196 wherein he points out the immediate threat: "By the
beginning of 1978, a total of twenty-three members of the bar had been murdered, one-
hundred nine detained, and forty-one had 'disappeared.' Among these members of the bar
were judges, law professors and officials of the Bar Association." Id. (citations omitted).
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lives, they became targets themselves. "In the end . . . bullets
[were] more powerful than writs." 8
VIL CONCLUSION
If bullets speak louder than words, can constitutional weakness
be blamed for the excesses of those firing? The rhetoric of reason
is often employed to justify infractions and constitutional ambiguity
affords plenty of room to make such rationalizations. Tragically for
Argentina, this considerable leeway has been exploited by rulers.
The junta was not satisfied with constitutional maxims. The rules of
the game were rewritten in language understood only by reading the
minds of the military leaders, sharing their phobias of World War III
and believing their fantasies of the future.
Enemies were repressed, so were the innocent. Rights valued
as fundamental were refused. The country was at war, the military
argued. War is "grim." War is "brutal." "Excesses" are an expected
part of every war."9 Both sides committed excesses; the military
routinely explained away its excesses. Particularly disturbing to some
was equating the excesses of the two sides, "where one side
represents and exercises the powers of the state."' This "eye for
an eye" mentality does not justify the excesses of the junta. Ample
legal resources were available to overcome the real terrorists."
A replay of the "dirty war" must never happen. Solutions to
conflicts must be found within constitutional bounds. Prevention lies
in clarifying constitutional ambiguities and deepening the resolve of
leaders to work within it.262 Perhaps the Supreme Court should
rethink the wisdom of the de facto doctrine or its refusal to review
the exercise of state of seige authority. Possibly the state of seige
258. Id. at 199.
259. Mission of Lawyers, supra note 68, at 485.
260. Id.
261. See Comment, supra note 106, at 827.
262. Author Daniel Poneman indicates that restraints on volatile forces in Argentina -- the
military, labor and the Church -- are virtually nonexistent in the Constitution. D.
PONEMAN, supra note 5, at 133. He suggests:
If the Constitution had taken hold, this omission would not have mattered; generals,
unionists, and bishops would simply lobby, as helpful contributors to the constitutional
scheme. But coups have gutted the constitutional center, and these institutions have
filled the vacuum. Now, if the Constitution cannot beat them, perhaps it should join
them, or at least set some ground rules.
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clause should be amended to eliminate gaps and define parameters
less vulnerable to insidious interpretation. Admittedly, this escape
clause is a necessary tool for endangered governments, but as it
exists and is used in Argentina, Article 23 invites abuse and
threatens to destroy the constitutional values it was meant to
preserve. As former United Nations Ambassador Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick pointed out: "Constitutions produce political goods by
respecting and harmonizing the diverse parts of the political
community. All the important political goods -- democracy, due
process, protection of rights to free speech, assembly -- are ... the
consequence of a wisely structured constitution." '
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